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I. INTRODUCTION
The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA)l is by all accounts the most
sweeping and comprehensive update to U.S. food laws in seventy years, aiming to
confront the reality that the nation's food supply has undergone fundamental shifts in
its sources, distribution channels, and intermediate handlers. The law's intent is to
prevent problems that can cause foodborne illness and enable the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to keep a record of facilities processing food for sale in the
United States, a mandate that expands FDA's already global regulatory activities. 2
FSMA gives FDA broad new powers to prevent food safety problems, detect and
respond to food safety issues, and improve the safety of imported foods.3 Because the
law specifically aims to update FDA authority in light of the reality of global food and
food additive markets, Section 305 FSMA calls for FDA to develop a comprehensive
plan to expand the "technical, scientific, and regulatory capacity of foreign
governments and their respective food industries in countries that export foods to the
United States." 4 Part of its plan for fulfilling its Section 305 obligation is actual
presence: FDA has established overseas offices in China, India, Costa Rica, Chile,
Mexico, Belgium, the UK, Italy, South Africa, and Jordan (closed).5 A separate aim is
to incorporate the work and insights from international organizations ranging from the
Food and Agriculture Organization to the World Health Organization to the World
t Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law; Scholar, O'Neill Institute for National and
Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil., Oxford
University; B.S., Kansas State University. The author is thankful to Susan Schneider's Food Law and Policy
seminar participants at the University of Arkansas as well as contributors to, and editors of, the Iron Triangle
of Food Law and Policy symposium issue of the American Journal ofLaw and Medicine, especially: Faculty
Advisor, Kevin Outterson; Symposium Editor, Hannah Fine; Managing Editor, Kathryn Gevitz; Articles
Editor, Nicholas Falcone; and Editor-in-Chief, Tanya Jane Beroukhim.
'FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7625 and in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
2 See FDA, FDA's INTERNATIONAL FOOD SAFETY CAPACITY BUILDING PLAN 5 (2013),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/UCM341440.pdf; Food Safety Modernization
Act, VT. AGENCY OF AGRIC. FOOD & MKTS., http://agriculture.vermont.gov/food safetyconsumer
protection/fsma.
See Vt. Agency of Agric. Food & Markets, supra note 2.
4 FDA, supra note 2, at v.
Report to Congress on the FDA Foreign Offices, FDA (Feb. 2012), http://www.fda.gov/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm291803.htm#summary.
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Bank to the OECD. 6 The FSMA statute specifies one particular international
organization for FDA attention with respect to its global activities: the Codex
Alimentarius Commission ("Codex").
FSMA requires that FDA develop "[rlecommendations on whether and how to
harmonize requirements under" Codex, an international organization charged with
developing food standards, guidelines, codes of practice and other recommendations
"to protect the health of consumers and to ensure fair practices in food trade."' Codex
sets standards on food quality and safety, including food commodity standards and
codes of hygienic or technological practice." In addition, Codex evaluates pesticides,
food additives and veterinary drugs, establishes limits for pesticide residues, and
creates guidelines for contaminants.9 Although the statutory language takes an agnostic
approach to Codex standards, FDA's International Food Safety Capacity-Building
Plan is supportive and deferential to Codex, arguing that "the use of Codex standards
helps assure a safe global food supply."10 To be sure, Codex's stated mission and
policies should create and facilitate adoption of universal standards and best practices
to ensure a safe global food supply, supported as it is by the World Health
Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization, specialized U.N. agencies
with well-regarded research capacity and public health-oriented mandates. Yet
Codex has been the subject of substantial criticism for failing to uphold its consumer
protection mandate.
Using the principal common criticisms of Codex-that it favors trade
liberalization over health, industry concerns over consumers', and rich countries over
poor ones-this article encourages FDA to leverage its new role as a global regulatory
body to inform its Codex work. This article contributes to the existing literature by
clarifying the scope and gravity of these common criticisms and showing how FDA
may use them to anticipate the changes global trade liberalization portends for keeping
the food supply safe. First, Codex's lean toward trade liberalization over consumer
health did not commence after it became the international standard-setting
organization under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS).
From its structure to its purpose, Codex processes have always favored trade
liberalization over high levels of health protection. Emphasizing Codex's emergence
from relative obscurity after 1994 distracts from the political and economic forces that
have shaped the organization from its founding and the infrastructure WHO, FAO and
Codex have put in place to ensure those forces are harnessed to the greatest extent
possible to further the organization's mission.
Second, studies and analyses of Codex decision-making frequently accuse it of
subordinating its agenda to industry interests. For the most part, these criticisms are
proven indirectly by, for example, counting industry representatives at Codex meetings
or as part of national delegations. But the real threats to the integrity of Codex's
processes have emerged not through routine industry participation on national
delegations or as observers, but through hidden efforts to influence scientists supplying
Codex's committees and subcommittees with purportedly objective information. The
6 FDA, supra note 2, at 3.
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No 111-353, § 305(c)(5), 124 Stat. 3885, 3958 (2011);
FDA, supra note 2, at 21.
For a list of the standards Codex covers, see Codex Standards, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS,
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/standards/en/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2015).
9 Id.
10 FDA, supra note 2, at 21.
" See About Codex, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/codex-home/en/ (last
updated Apr. 8, 2015).
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response to that threat is better systems for declarations of interest and transparency,
an effort FDA is well positioned to lead. Third, critics accuse Codex of undertaking its
work with insufficient participation by developing countries or inadequate sensitivity
to their resource constraints. But, other than the argument that participation matters for
its own sake, there has been little investigation as to concrete harms to developing
countries by existing levels of participation. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that
the problems for developing countries are not caused by Codex, but by developed
countries' insistence on imposing standards more stringent than Codex adopts or
allowing private entities to effectively push standards higher through supply
agreements.
It is reasonable to assume that, if the Doha trade round ever results in freer trade
in agricultural goods, Codex will be a prime target for erecting barriers to entry for
those goods not necessarily related to its consumer health protection mandate. These
weaknesses in the current Codex standard development process are outlined with the
objective of informing FDA's approach to determining which Codex standards have
been effectively and responsibly informed and, if so, how they may be harmonized
with U.S. law. This article is part of a larger story about how FDA's mandate-
protection of U.S. consumers' health-will adapt as rules it adopts will be subject to
challenge under international trade and investment treaties.
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of Codex and how its members are
chosen as well as the general nature of its activities. Part III outlines the three common
criticisms of Codex and how FDA may address each within the scope of its new
FSMA authority. Part IV provides a brief conclusion and preview of how FDA's role
must adapt in the face of the increasing strength of international trade and investment
treaties.
II. THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF THE CODEX COMMISSION
A. CODEX'S HISTORY AND STRUCTURE
The history of Codex dates back to the creations of the FAO and WHO in the late
1940s.1 In 1950, the FAO and WHO formed the First Joint Expert Committee on
Nutrition ("Joint Expert Committee"), emphasizing the need to address the
inconsistencies of international food standards. In 1955, the Fourth Joint Expert
Committee declared the uncontrolled use of food additives a pressing matter of public
concern and established a committee to draft guidelines on food additive control and
use.
The Joint Expert Committee joined a number of international and regional food
regulatory agencies that had evolved in the post-war period. The United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, for example, established a Geneva Protocol which
proposed standards and guidelines for food commodities, mainly fruits and vegetables.
The FAO/WHO Committee of Governmental Experts worked with the International
Dairy Federation to implement milk quality and labeling requirements. Europe had
worked out a region-wide harmonization system, the Codex Alimentarius Europaeus,
based on a model developed under the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.13 The Codex
12 Codex Timelme from 1945 to the Present, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS,
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/ about-codex/codex-timeline/en/ (last visited May 5, 2015).
" The term "Codex Alimentarius" derives from the Codex Alimentarius Austracius, a collection of
food standards developed by the former Austrian-Hungarian empire, which originated as early as 1891 and
was completed in 1917. Rep. of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, 19th Sess., July 1-10,
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Europeaeus was co-sponsored by the International Commission on Agricultural
Industries and the International Bureau of Analytical Chemistry.1 4
In 1960, the Codex Alimentarius Europaeus partnered with WHO and FAO as
part of an effort to create a global set of food safety, testing, labeling and nutrition
standards. During the 1961 FAO/WHO Eleventh Joint Expert Committee, the FAO
passed the resolution, which led to the establishment of the Codex Alimentarius
Commission as it is known today. The resolution created the FAO/WHO Food
Standards Programme and designated the newly international Codex as the body
responsible for implementing the Programme.
The First Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission was held in Rome in
October 1963, and was attended by an estimated 120 participants from 30 countries.
Codex has seen dramatic increase in membership since; 625 delegates from 180
countries and international organizations attended the Commission's thirty-forth
session in 2011. Both independent international experts and other international
organizations assist Codex in meeting its obligation to develop an extensive scientific
basis for the standards it adopts.1
Codex offers three avenues of organizational participation based on a party's
qualifications. First, membership is open to all countries but is contingent upon
memberships in both the WHO and FAO.16 Only member countries and member
organizations ("Members") approve standards and guidelines, sit on committees within
the organization, and submit candidates for executive positions.1 7 Second, countries
and organizations who either do not qualify for membership or choose not to become
Members can still participate in Codex as observing parties ("Observers")."' While
Observers are technically not entitled to give input at sessions, Observers customarily
have been permitted to express their opinions on particular issues and policies. 19 Third,
intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs") and nongovernmental organizations
20("NGOs") also may attain Observer status. IGOs are required to submit an
application for review by the Codex Secretariat and the legal offices of both the WHO
and FAO, where additional inquiries may be required.21 The application process for
unaffiliated NGOs is similar, though NGO applications require more detailed
information.22
1991, ALINORM 91/40 app. 2 (1991), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/005/
t0490e/TO490E04.htm.
14 Codex Timelme from 1945 to the Present, supra note 12.
" See Scientific Basis for Codex Work, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/
scientific-basis/en/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2015).
1 Codex Members and Observers, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/
members-observers/en/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2015).
" CONSUMERS INT'L, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS FOR CONSUMERS 12 (2nd ed. 2000),
http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/302887/codex%/`2Oalimentarius-
%20a%20set%20of/o2Othree%/`2Oresource%/`2Omanuals.pdf.
" Codex Members and Observers, supra note 16.
'9 CONSUMTERS INT'L, supra note 17.
20 Codex Members and Observers, supra note 16.
21 Id. The IGO application for observer status is available online. CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N,
INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS REQUESTING
"OBSERVER STATUS" (2013), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/forms/Observer Application
FormIGO_2013e.pdf (last visited May 5, 2015).
22 See Principles Concerning the Participation of International Non-Governmental Organizations in
the Work of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS,
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/members-observers/ngo-participation/en/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2015).
The application for observer status for NGOs is available online. CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N,
INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS REQUESTING
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B. CODEX DECISION-MAKING
The top of Codex's hierarchal ladder is the Codex Alimentarius Commission
("Commission"), which represents the collective interests of the aforementioned
Members and Observers. The Commission sets Codex's overall agenda and is the final
decisionmaking body in all standard creation.23 Every Member present at a particular
session is entitled to one vote on all issues submitted to the Commission.24 The U.S.
government and its agencies play an active role throughout Codex's organizational
hierarchy and frequently drive new policy. 2 5 For example, FDA participates in every
26Codex Subsidiary Body. The FDA works to influence the committees to adopt
standards in accordance with U.S. law, while also pressing for domestic adoption of
Codex standards.2 7
The Codex Alimentarius Commission's main authoritative organ is its Executive
Committee ("Executive Committee"), which consists of seventeen members drawn
from both Codex's general membership and regional representatives.28 The Executive
Committee manages the development of committee standards and guidelines, and
develops strategic plans for implementation.29 Typically, the Executive Committee
combines such submissions with those of lower level subcommittees for Commission
consensus or vote.30 The Executive Committee may exercise the Commission's powers
31
to appoint subcommittee officials or implement Commission approved standards.
Commission votes often are conducted by secret ballot, and while Codex custom, like
that of other international organizations, stresses consensus,32it has adopted several
standards through secret ballot applying majority vote (sometimes narrowly so) for
such decisions.3 3 The Codex Secretariat facilitates communications between members,
committees, and the commission.34
Beneath the Codex's executive and administrative organs sit four subsidiary
bodies responsible for developing the standards to be reviewed by the Commission and
Executive Committee.3 5 These subsidiary bodies create subcommittees to develop
"OBSERVER STATUS" (2013), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/forms/Observer Application
FormNGO_2013e.pdf (last visited May 5, 2015).
23 CONSUMERS INT'L, supra note 17.
24 Id. at 19.
25 See U.S. Codex & Codex Alimentarius, USDA, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/
intemational-affairs/us-codex-alimentarius (last updated Mar. 24, 2015).
26 See CVM's Participation in the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods and the
Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/
centersoffices/officeoffoods/cvm/whatwedo/ucm282088.htm (last updated Aug. 25, 2014); FDA's
Participation in Codex, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/food/intemationalinteragencycoordination/
intemationalcooperation/ucm106250.htm (last updated Dec. 12, 2014).
27 FDA's Participation in Codex, supra note 25.
28 CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, FAO/WHO CODEX TRAINING PACKAGE: MODULE 2.3 3,
ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/food/capacity building/2_3.pdf.
29 Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, Codex Alimentarius Commission: Procedural Manual 9 (12th ed.
2001), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/Y2200E/Y2200E00.pdf.
30 Id. at 19-21.
Id. at 9.
32 The Codex has clarified that consensus does not require unanimity, but rather alludes to a standard
less than unanimity but more than supermajority. See CONSUMERS INT'L, supra note 17, at 15.
3 Id. at 11.
3 See id. at 19-21.
For an organization chart, see Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, Guidelines for Codex Contact Points
and National Codex Committees (Asia) 8, CAC GL/57-1999 (1999), available at
www.codexalimentarius.org/input/download/standards/.../cxg_057Re.pdf.
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standards for specific issues.3 Each subcommittee is headed by a host country, which
is responsible for subcommittee maintenance and administrative functions.3 7 Host
countries are also required to shoulder a considerable amount of the costs of
subcommittee operations. Cost requirements restrict hosting privileges to developed
countries and the ability to host gives that country a heavy hand in setting the agenda
with WHO and FAO.3 8
The first subsidiary body contains Codex's General Subject Committees.3 9
Currently, the General Subject Committees consist of ten subcommittees that develop
generally applicable principles. 40 The General Subcommittees are commonly called
"horizontal committees" because their work applies broadly to all foods.4 1 As the chief
subsidiary body, the General Subcommittees assist the Executive Committee in
reviewing and endorsing standards derived from other committees and subcommittees.
Horizontal committees focus on health and safety recommendations such as food
hygiene, additives or contaminants, labeling, and inspection systems. The General
Subcommittees develop such standards and recommendations based on the advice of
42
expert scientific bodies.
The Commission's second grouping of subsidiary bodies are called Commodity
Committees and are responsible for the largest number of specific standards.4 3 The
Commodity Committees are also known as "vertical committees" because, unlike the
General Subcommittees, the Commodity Committees are restricted in focus and
responsibilities. These committees research and develop proposals for standards in
non-individualized food products such as fats and oils, milk and milk products,
processed fruits and vegetables, and sugars. Commodity Committees are created as
needed to address particular issues in such food categories. The Commodity
Committees have integrated NGOs into standard development. Frequently, NGOs
combine to shoulder the workload of certain Commodity Committees, which
occasionally leads the NGO groupings to become subcommittees themselves.
Codex has also developed a process by which "Ad Hoc Task Forces" may be
formed for specific purposes and a limited time. 5 An Ad Hoc Task Force's scope is
narrower than that of a Commodity Committee; Ad Hoc Task Forces are assembled to
create guidelines for one or more specific issues within a subgroup of a food category
already covered by general or commodity committees. 46 Ad Hoc Task Forces
originated in 1999 when the Commission realized that its rigid committee structure
was incapable of the flexibility required to meet the volatile and ever-increasing
demands for additional standards.
6 See CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, UNDERSTANDING THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 16-19 (3d ed.
2006), ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/UnderstandingEN.pdf.
Id. at 16-17.
* See id. at 19.
39 Id. at 17-18.
40 Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Lesson 2.1 -How Codex is Organized: The General Subject
Committees, IMARK GROUP, http://www.imarkgroup.org/projects/course/moduleX/EN/
downloadresource.asp?filelocation-pdf/GeneralSubjectCommittees.pdf (last visited May 5, 2015).
41 CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, supra note 36, at 17.
42 See id. at 22-24. Expert scientific bodies include: Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food
Additives (JECFA); Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Microbiological Risk Assessment (JEMRA);
Joint FAO/WHO Meetings on Pesticide Residues (JMPR). Id.at 23; see also FAO, supra note 50.
43 CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, supra note 36, at 18.
44 Id. at 9.
45
1 Id. at 18.
46 See id. Previously assembled Ad Hoc Task Forces include: Task Force on Animal Feeding (1999-
2004) and Task Force on Fruits and Vegetable Juices (1999-2005). Id. at 19.
47 Id. at 18.
411
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE
C. THE COMMISSION'S PROCEDURES
The Codex meetings are listed as open to the public on condition that anyone
aspiring to be invited provide written notice to the Codex Secretariat at least one
month prior to the particular meeting.4 " However, such public invitations are subject to
spacing availability.4 9 Frequently, heads of relevant industries attend and contribute to
Codex sessions consultatively.
Codex standard creation and adoption follows a common pattern throughout all
organizational levels. First, the Executive Committee reviews and prioritizes all
proposals, which may be submitted by any Member party. The Executive Committee
may even consider proposals from Observers or other parties. 0 If a proposal is
prioritized for further review, the Executive Committee submits a proposal draft to all
Member countries for comment. 51 Next, Subsidiary Bodies and subcommittees
relevant to the particular issue review the revised draft to ensure compliance with
52Codex standards. The Codex Commission, either by consensus or vote, determines
whether the draft standards should be submitted for finalization. The draft then enters a
final comment period, after which the Commission adopts the standards and the
Secretariat publishes them. 5 3 Standards sometimes may be adopted and published
before the second round of Member comments if a two-thirds majority was shown
during the first comment round.
III. STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE CODEX DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS
A. BALANCING CODEX'S TRADE AND HEALTH MISSIONS
Technically, Codex standards are neither binding nor self-executing even among
its member countries. 5 Each government is free to develop its own food health and
safety standards framework.5 6 Practically, Codex guidelines are more influential.
Codex has been designated the official standard reference body for the WTO when
food safety or labeling measures are challenged as burdening free trade, according to
its Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement.58 It plays a similar, although not
dominant, role for the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. All countries
who agreed to the creation of the WTO in 1994 may be bound by WTO panel
decisions regarding SPS and TBT issues; 59 therefore, these countries may be
48 Codex Members and Observers, supra note 16.
49 Id. Codex's documented Members, Observers, and invitees currently account for over 600 delegates.
CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, supra note 36, at 15.
'o CONSUMERS INT'L, supra note 17, at 16.
5 CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, supra note 36, at 15.
5 2 Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
5 See CONSUMERS INT'L, supra note 17, at 16.
FAQs- General Questions, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/faqs/general-
questions/en/ (last visited May 5, 2015).
56 Id.
5 See Codex Timeline from 1945 to the Present, supra note 12.
5' The WTO's SPS Agreement was established in 1995 to regulate food, plant, and animal safety and
health regulations. Id. The adjudicatory arm ("Panels") of the WTO resolves trade disputes regarding such
issues, and can impose or permit trade-based punitive measures for violations of the SPS Agreement. See
Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/spse/spsund e.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
59 See Michael A. Livermore, Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation,
Institutional Differentiation, and the CodexAlimentarius, 8 1 N.Y.U. L. REv. 766, 768 (2006).
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constrained by Codex standards.6 If a Member country wishes to impose SPS-related
standards more stringent than Codex's standards, the country must provide an
adequate scientific basis for taking such actions.6
Criticism aimed at Codex activities after 1994 has frequently if not uniformly
referred to the special role afforded it under the World Trade Organization's free trade
62
regime. Emily Lee, for example, argued that the "linkage between Codex standards
and the WTO has diverted the focus of the Commission from health to trade
,63
considerations." Elizabeth Smythe added that "[a]s a result of its changing role,
Codex rule-making processes have become more politicized . .. reflected in . .. the
increased involvement of national trade officials pursuing their interests, and the
increased attention and involvement of other organizations."64 Ching-Fu Lin echoes
the sentiment, asserting that "[a]ll of [Codex's] problems have rendered Codex
unbalanced between public health and fair food trade practices ... 65
But from Codex's origin-when a number of regional standard-setting
organizations threatened to disrupt global trade in food-to the present day, the
organization's mission has always been trade-oriented.66 In 1973, L.M. Beacham, the
Assistant to the Director of the FDA for International Standards wrote of Codex's
mission that it was to create "a collection of internationally adopted food standards that
harmonize the legal requirements of the participating countries, thereby facilitating
international trade and affording consumers sound, wholesome products, informatively
labeled in a uniform manner."67 In their brief history of Codex, Franz Vojir, Erwin
Schubl and Ibrahim Elmadfa wrote that "the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
and the World Health Organization (WHO) of the United Nations were intent on
impeding . . . regional activities [in rules for the testing of food samples] to prevent
6o Id. at 768-69. The WTOs near codification of Codex Alimentarius standards regarding sanitary and
phytosanitary measures likely casts Codex's SPS-related actions as the organization's most significant
activity. See A.W. Randell & A.J. Whitehead, CodexAlimentarius: Food Quality and Safety Standards for
International Trade, 16 REVUE SCIENTIFIQUE ET TECHNIQUE DE L'OFFICE INTERNATIONAL DES EPIZOOTIES
313, 316-17 (1997).
6' The SPS Agreement instructs its Members "to base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on
international standards" (Article 3.1.) and presumes those international standards to "be consistent with the
relevant portions of this Agreement and of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 1994" (Article
3.2). The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement),
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/sps e/spsagr e.htm (last visited May 5, 2015); see also David
A. Wirth, The Transatlantic GMO Dispute Against the European Communities: Some Preliminary Thoughts,
in EU AND WTO LAW: HOW TIGHT IS THE LEGAL STRAIGHTJACKET FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT
REGULATION? 175, 183 (Marc Pallemaerts ed., 2006).
62 See Jennifer Clapp & Doris Fuchs, Agrifood Corporations, Global Governance, and Sustainability:
A Framework for Analysis, in CORPORATE POWER IN GLOBAL AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 1, 14 (Jennifer
Clapp & Doris Fuchs eds., 2009).
6' Emily Lee, The World Health Organization's Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity, and
Health: Turning Strategy into Action, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 569, 595 (2005).
64 Elizabeth Smythe, In Whose Interests? Transparency and Accountability in the Global Governance
ofFood: Agribusiness, the Codex Alimentarius, and the World Trade Organization, in CORPORATE POWER
IN GLOBAL AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 93, 96 (Jennifer Clapp & Doris Fuchs eds., 2009).
61 Ching-Fu Lin, Public-Private Interactions in Global Food Safety Governance, 69 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 143, 146 (2014); see also Doris Fuchs et al., Retail Power, Private Standards, and Sustainability in the
Global Food System, in CORPORATE POWER IN GLOBAL AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 30, 37 (Jennifer Clapp &
Doris Fuchs eds., 2009).
66 See The CodexAlimentarius Commission: Looking Ahead to Its Future Scope, 3 WORLD FOOD REG.
REV. 16, 16 (1993) ("[Codex's] purpose is to guide and promote the elaboration and establishment of
definitions and requirements for food, to assist in their harmonisation and, in doing so, facilitate
international trade."), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/moo24a99/pdf.
67 L.M. Beacham, Ten Years of Codex Alimentarius-A Progress Report, FOREIGN AGRIC. 10, 10
(1973), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/odj92a99/pdf.
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trade barriers at a global level."6 Some of Codex's closest majority votes have favored
trade-facilitation over health concerns, even those expressed by wealthy, influential
members.6 9
To be fair to critics, Codex and its participants have done little to diminish the
appearance of imbalance toward trade or industry influence. Codex's structure has
always leaned in favor of not only trade, but also countries with substantial interests in
a given food or subject area, which Codex gives privileged status within the standard-
setting process. Norway, for example, has always hosted standard-setting for fish and
fishery products; China hosts the food additives and pesticide residues committees;
and Switzerland hosts the now-adjourned committees on natural mineral waters and
70
cocoa or chocolate products. In each of these cases, the host country is either a
leading exporter of the regulated commodity or chemical or home to major global
firms.
1. Advancing Public Health through Codex Processes
But Codex has also incorporated international health agreements and evidence
generated by the strong research capacities of WHO and FAO. Codex standards on
infant formula, for example, not only tightly regulate the components of formula (e.g.,
vitamins, minerals, and essential nutrients) but also incorporate key aspects of the
1981 World Health Organization's International Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes. This is to enable regulatory authorities to require manufacturers to include
labels stating the superiority of breastfeeding for infants, prohibiting pictures of infants
or women that idealize formula use, and advising consumers that they should use
formula only on the advice of an independent health worker, without falling afoul of
the SPS Agreement. These measures may be subject to challenge, however, under
another WTO agreement like TBT or TRIPS.7 1 To be sure, that standard and standards
that followed gave regulators and firms ways to circumvent the full protections of the
1981 Code. But the inclusion of these key health measures in Codex standards belies
the claim that Codex cannot be used to advance the cause of global or population
health or give flexibility to governments that wish to do so. Similarly, Codex standards,
when read together, provide significant flexibility for governments to protect
consumers' health.7 2
2. FDA's Role in Endorsing Advances in Nutrition Science
FDA is therefore well positioned to influence standard-setting in light of advances
in nutrition science as assessed by both FDA and WHO. One of the ways in which
consumers are consistently misled about their calorie and nutrient intake is by labels
that depict nutritional information per serving even for food packages or bottled
6' Franz Vojir et al., The Origins of a Global Standard for Food Quality and Safety: Codex
AlimentariusAustriacus and FAO/WHO CodexAlimentarius, 82 INT'L. J. VITAMIN & NUTRITION RES. 223,
223 (2012).
69 See International Harmonization ofFood Safety and Labeling Standards: Threats and Opportunities
for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, CTR. FOR SCI. PUB.
INTEREST (June 1997), http://www.cspinet.org/reports/codex.htm.
o See LINHAI WU & DIAN ZHU, FOOD SAFETY IN CHINA: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 239 (2015); List
of Active Codex Committees, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/committees-and-
task-forces/en/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2015).
n CODEX STANDARD 72-1981 § 9.6 (Codex Alimentarius Comm'n 2011).
72 See F. Edward Scarbrough, Codex-What's All the Fuss?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 631, 631-33
(2010).
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beverages that are commonly consumed in a single sitting.7 3 Codex standards largely
accommodate this labeling method, and an effective way to use the Codex process to
advance global health is to eliminate the option for manufacturers to provide
nutritional information in unrealistic ways.
Codex has a mixed record with respect to allowing advances in global population
health analysis to inform its standard setting process. The aforementioned Codex
standards on infant formula, for example, are relatively progressive but Codex has
largely ignored the relationship between food labeling and agricultural policies on diet
and health." The WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity, and Health calls on
Codex to undertake processes that ensure better labeling to allow more effective
information about the benefits and contents of foods; measures to minimize the impact
of marketing on unhealthy dietary patterns; and production and processing standards
regarding the nutritional quality and safety of products.75 WHO recommendations
track to a significant extent similar conclusions reached by FDA along with other
federal agencies on advice about consuming fewer calories and making informed food
choices to attain and maintain a healthy weight, reduce risk of chronic disease, and
76promote overall health. These calls have been more or less ignored, so that current
77Codex standards may be and are effectively used to hide consumption risks. As an
example, Codex standards now require the listing of ingredients in descending order
according to proportion, but do not effectively limit the re-characterization or overlap
of ingredients so that salts and sugars may comprise a much larger portion of a labeled
food than a descending order of ingredients would lead a consumer to believe.78
Similarly, Codex standards for "natural flavouring substances" leave substantial
flexibility to manufacturers to process any "natural material of animal or vegetable
origin" through drying, torrefaction, fermentation, microbiological or enzymatic
process and other methods even when those processes result in changes in the
chemical structure of the flavouring.7 9
B. INDUSTRY REPRESENTATION AS A PROXY FOR INDUSTRY INFLUENCE
FDA's credibility when asserting the desirability of Codex standards will be
jeopardized as long as Codex's processes for adopting standards appear compromised.
To be clear, Codex critics are often vague as to how industry influence (and whether it
is beneficial or not) is to be measured. There is wide consensus in the literature on
Codex that its processes are subject to industry capture, but the primary means of
proving the claim are anecdotal or derived through reference to relative participation
by firms or industrial groups. An oft-quoted 1993 study conducted by the National
Food Alliance found that "over eighty percent of the nongovernmental participants on
national delegations to recent Codex committees represented industry, while only one
7 See Proposed Changes to the Nutrition Facts Label, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatorylnformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm385663.htm#Summ
ary (last updated Aug. 1, 2014).
74 See Lee, supra note 63, at 577-78.
7 Id. at 578-79.
76 Dietary Guidelines for Americans, USDA, http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/DietaryGuidelines (last visited
May 5, 2015).
77 See Lee, supra note 63, at 580.
71 CODEX STANDARD 1-1985 § 4.2.1.3 (Codex Alimentarius Comm'n 2010).
79 Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, Guidelines for the Use of Flavourings, CAC/GL66-2008 (2008),
available at www.codexalimentarius.org/input/download/standards/ ... /cxg_066e.pdf.
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percent represented public interest organizations." 0 Elizabeth Smythe notes that the
Codex Committee on Food labeling has shown similar industry influence with 35 of 50
international non-governmental organizations in attendance at the 2000 meeting
representing industry and about 75% of observers in 2006 and 2007.1 Industry
representatives similarly enjoy greater participatory roles as part of national
812
delegations.
It is a fair inference that greater participation of both observers and national
delegates translates into greater influence, 83 but it is not always clear that
influence as part of one or more delegations or as observers will move the needle
on the standards as they move through the process. New Zealand's National
Organisations for Fruit and Vegetable Growers and Grocery Marketers Association
might both attend or participate in New Zealand's Codex processes, but advocate
opposing positions for their government. 4
Codex standards as adopted by FDA will not only gain legitimacy in consumers'
eyes but also better reflect the high scientific standards Codex promises if FDA adopts
two principal review mechanisms for Codex standards. First, FDA should apply its
own internal conflict of interest policies to its review of Codex standards with the
same rigor as it applies to outside scientific advice on its current portfolio of consumer
products. Because FDA is a participant in Codex standard setting, there is an implicit
assumption that FDA has undertaken a full analysis of potential conflicts at the
international level. FSMA's regime of reviewing conflicts of interest for third-party
verification entities for food imports"' counsels in favor of stricter review of the
scientific assessments that inform Codex work. Second, FDA should make the
selection of non-governmental Codex representatives in the U.S. national delegation
more transparent. While both steps would require FDA taking a larger leadership role
within the U.S. Codex Office (now housed at USDA), there is no formal legal
hindrance to these steps by FDA that FSMA implicitly authorizes or encouraged.
1. Breaches in Codex's Scientific Assessment Integrity
The most alarming episodes of industry influence at Codex have not occurred
through routine member or observer participation at the subcommittee level in the
Codex process but at WHO/FAO joint scientific committees, ostensibly neutral and
highly-qualified scientific bodies whose conclusions are given substantial weight in
the standard setting process. In 1990, an international tobacco research arm, Centre de
Cooperation pour les Recherches Scientifiques Relatives au Tabac (CORESTA), hired
a former WHO toxicologist and former technical secretary of the Joint Food and
8o Lucinda Sikes, FDA 's Consideration of Codex Alimentarius Standards in Light of International
Trade Agreements, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 327, 330 (1998) (citing NATALIE AVERY ET. AL., CRACKING THE
CODEX: AN ANALYSIS OF WHO SETS WORLD FOOD STANDARDS 1 (1993)).
8 Smythe, supra note 64, at 98.
82 Id.
8 OTHO D. EASTERDAY & JULIA C. HOWELL, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD LAWS
COMMITTEE 1 (1989), available at http://legacy.1ibrary.ucsf.edu/tid/rrhl4d00/pdf ("The activities of the ad
hoc FEMA [Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association]/FDA/USDA group that developed a system for
prioritization of flavorings was of particular interest to the committee members... JECFA has commenced
using the system by selecting high priority compounds from the list of prioritized flavorings. One substance,
quinine hydrochloride, is being evaluated by JECFA in June 1989.").
84 See FOOD STANDARDS AUSTL. N.Z., DRAFT ASSESSMENT REPORT: PROPOSAL P237: COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN LABELLING [sic] OF FOOD 18-33 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety Audits
and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782 (proposed July 29, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1,
16).
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Agriculture Organization/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR), Gaston
Vettorazzi, to influence the international standard for ethylene thiourea (ETU). ETU is
a breakdown product for a tobacco pesticide known to cause cancer.8 The JMPR is an
international meeting of scientists whose decisions often formed the basis of Codex
standards and the consultant effectively raised the ADI level from 0.002 to 0.004
mg/kg body weight. 7 Vettorazzi exercised his influence through the benign-sounding
(Codex qualified International Non-Governmental Organization) International
Toxicology Information Centre (ITIC) which was financed through "sale of its various
scientific outputs" and by "Vettorazzi Associates", the entity through which
CORESTA hired Vettorazzi for $100,000 per year." In internal promotional literature,
ITIC touted its "counseling on matters related to the Codex Alimentarius, particularly
the Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants (CCFAC), the Codex
Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) and the Codex Committee on Veterinary
Drugs Residues." 89 In one promotional newsletter, it stated:
The development of a new ITIC International Safety Review is a process
that requires a close interaction between the ITIC and the party
interested in the safety of a specific chemical. It is this mutual
collaboration that makes this program a novel and unique project. The
results are objective, functional, tailored-to-the-need, scientific and
credible safety reviews on commercially viable products.9 0
In other words, ITIC's scientific assessments and its connection to members of
key WHO bodies were up for sale. Safety evaluations from ITIC included not only
ETU, but zineb (registrations canceled in U.S. following EPA special review), maneb
91 92
and ziram (linked to increased risk of Parkinson's)91 and Allura Red AC (Red #40).
2. Opaque Relationships between Codex and Industry Coalitions
The International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) is an industry coalition
organization that funds research in "pathology, toxicology, and nutrition," but the
organization's Board of Members consists of one representative from each member
company, most of which are global firms with a significant footprint in agrifood, food
additive, and food chemical markets like Cargill, Monsanto, Mars, Coca-Cola, Nestle,
PepsiCo, and Unilever. 9 3 Remarking on ILSI's mission in the face of increasing food
regulation in the late 1980s, Alex Malaspina from Coca-Cola declared that "ILSI is
prepared to meet [new] challenges by continuing to generate scientific data to resolve
8 Patricia A. McDaniel et al., Commentary, The Tobacco Industry and Pesticide Regulations: Case
Studies from Tobacco Industry Archives, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1659, 1661 (2005).
87 Id.
" Consultancy Agreement Between Vettorazzi Associates and CORESTA (Sept. 30, 1993), available
at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cwb24e00.
89 VETTORAZZI ASSOCS., PAMPHLET, http://legacy.1ibrary.ucsf.edu/tid/zhq25c00/pdf (pamphlet
describing Vettorazzi Associates operating principles, services, and credentials of Director Gaston
Vetorrazi); see also The ITIC in [sic] now an NGO, ITIC NEWSLETTER (Int'l Toxicology Information Ctr.,
San Sebastian, Spain) Dec. 1992, at 1, available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/suo24a99.
90 Id. at 4.
91 Anthony Wang et al., Parkinson 's Disease Risk from Ambient Exposure to Pesticides, 26 EUR. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 547, 552 (2011).
92 Gaston Vettorazzi et al., International Safety Assessment ofPesticides: Dithiocarbamate Pesticides,
ETU, and PTU-A Review and Update, 15 TERATOGENESIS CARCINOGENESIS & MUTAGENESIS 313, 313
(1995).
9 Board ofDirectors, INT'L LIFE SCI. INST., http://www.ilsi.org/Europe/Pages/Board-of-Directors.aspx
(last visited May 5, 2015); Leadership and Supporting Companies, INT'L LIFE SCI. INST.,
http://www.ilsi.org/Pages/Leadership.aspx (last visited May 5, 2015).
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pending issues, providing relevant scientific data to state agencies, and working to
harmonize food regulations and facilitate international trade."9 4 ILSI enjoys a close
relationship with regulatory bodies including the Joint WHO/FAO Expert Committee
on Food Additives95 and the European Food Safety Authority,96 which rely on the
substantial resources controlled by the ILSI.
The organization not only influences Codex standards through direct cooperation
with national and international regulators, but also indirectly through the networks it
develops. Between 1987 and 1989, for example, Dr. John Kirschman served as a
member of ILSI representing RJR Nabisco; one of the "Tobacco" staffers of RJR
Nabisco's Corporate Center for Excellence in Toxicology (established to coordinate
toxicology activities across at least two affiliate business lines); and as a member of
the U.S. national delegation alongside representatives from the Department of
Commerce, FDA, and USDA.9 7 Wearing all three hats, Kirschman reported to RJR
Nabisco's corporate toxicologist about Codex priorities, computerization of WHO and
FAO operations, other members of the U.S. delegation, and country -specific
developments that affected RJR Nabisco business and research priorities.9 8
3. FDA's Role in Advancing Transparency Domestically and at Codex
It is not that Codex does not solicit information on potential conflicts of interest
from scientists or experts, it is that it does not appear to have processes in place to
ensure candor and, even when it receives relevant information, does not elaborate on
its reasons for finding a conflict or not. For example, from its 6 9 th Report on the Joint
WHO/FAO Committee on Food Additives,
The Secretariat informed the Committee that all experts participating in
the present sixty-ninth meeting had completed declaration-of-interest
forms and that no conflicts had been identified. The following declared
interests and potential conflicts were discussed by the Committee.
Professor Andrew Renwick consulted for the International Sweeteners
Association and hence did not participate in the discussions on steviol
glycosides. The employer of Dr [sic] Ian Munro receives part of its
revenues from consulting on the safety assessment of food additives. The
company, but not Dr [sic] Munro himself, prepared submissions
regarding the assessments of steviol glycosides. Dr [sic] Paul Kuznesof
consulted for Tate & Lyle to gather publicly available information on
steviol glycosides, but this activity was not regarded as a conflict of
interest. Professor Ron Walker consulted for one of the producing
94 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the ILSI and ILSI-NF Boards of Members 1 (Jan. 21, 1989),
available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pyu56a00/pdf.
95 Robert Verkerk, The International Food Code of Codex Alimentarius, ETHICAL CONSUMER,
http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/commentanalysis/factsvgreenwash/codexalimentarius.aspx (last visited
May 5, 2015).
96 See generally EUR. FOOD SAFETY AUTH., EFSA MEETING SUMMARY REPORT: EFSA/WHO
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH SUPPORT OF ILSI EUROPE ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF COMPOUNDS THAT
ARE BOTH GENOTOXIC AND CYTOTOXIC (2006), available at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/
home/publication/ efsawho2006.pdf.
9 See RJR Interoffice Memorandum from John C. Kirschman to A. Wallace Hayes (July 31, 1987),
available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pct75a00/pdf.
98 See RJR NABISCO, INC., CORPORATE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE IN TOXICOLOGY,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hmpl5dOO/pdf?search=%`/22kirschman%/`2Oexcellence%/`20research%/`22.
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companies on calcium lignosulfonate and hence did not participate in the
discussion."
The selection of members for the U.S. delegation to Codex is similarly opaque.
For example, the USDA Food Safety Information Service noted that for the 36th
Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission in 2013 "[t]he United States was
represented by Delegate Mary Frances Lowe, U.S. Manager for Codex, eight
governmental advisors, three non-governmental advisors, and two former chairs of the
CAC."1oo
Under current federal regulations, FDA largely relies on interested persons and
domestic constituencies to guide the Codex standard adoption and implementation
process. 101 While the FDA Commissioner has broad authority to introduce Codex
standards, including deviations, the Commissioner's decision to do so does not
explicitly require an independent assessment of potential conflicts of interest on
relevant WHO/FAO committees informing relevant health measures like pesticide
residues and acceptable daily intakes of food additives or their elements. In fact, the
regulations strongly hint that it will be inclined to adopt standards that garner sufficient
domestic consensus, whether or not that consensus includes consumer advocacy or
public health opinion.102 Similarly, while the U.S. Codex Office is technically within
the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service, FDA's broad consumer protection
mandate and specific authorization with respect to Codex give it authority to make
participation in U.S. delegations more transparent.
C. CODEX AND THE WELFARE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The relationship between Codex and the welfare of developing countries has
emerged as one of its most contested roles. Codex is managed and funded by
wealthy countries that have a significant interest in what it declares to be
international standards that both protect consumers and facilitate trade. Whether
intentionally or not, the standards promoted by these countries necessarily
impose resource barriers to low- and middle-income countries and even
participation in Codex processes can be cost prohibitive. In 2003, former Director-
Generals of both the WHO and FAO launched the Codex Trust Fund ("Trust Fund" or
"Fund") to assist developing nations join and participate in Codex processes.103 The
Trust Fund sought $40 million over a period of 12 years to assist the transition
required by developing nations to meet the organization's food safety, quality, and
fairness standards. 104 By the end of 2013, only $18.77 million was donated from 15
countries. o0 Trust Fund donation information is open to the public, and the Fund is
audited internally and externally per WHO regulations.106
99 Sixty-Ninth Meeting of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Rome, Italy,
June 17-26, 2008, Evaluation of Certain Food Additives, at 1, WHO TECHNICAL REP. SERIES No. 952
(2009).
'0o 36th Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, USDA, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/
poral/fsis/topics/international-affairs/us-codex-alimentarius/recent-delegation-reponts/delegate-repor-36th-
session-cac (last updated Sept. 4, 2013).
101 Review of Codex Alimentarius Food Standards, 21 CFR § 130.6(c) (2012).
102 See id.
'0' Codex Alimentarius: FAQ/WHO Trust Fund for Participation in Codex, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS,
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/faowho-trust-fund/en/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2015). Dr. Gro Harlem
Brundtland (WHO) and Dr. Jacques Diouf (FAO) launched the fund during the 25th session of Codex. Id.
104 Id.
'0' Codex Trust Fund: Donor Contributions, WHO, http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areaswork/food-
standard/codextrustfund/en/indexl.html (last visited May 5, 2015). The list of donating countries and
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Codex's standards, especially good manufacturing processes, inspection,
import and export control, and other aspects of its mission are expensive to
implement and poor countries often lack the resources to comply or
participate.107 These decisions may indeed reflect trade-restrictive efforts by
wealthy but resource disadvantaged countries. Certain kinds of infestations for the
same crop may require lighter or heavier applications of insecticides, pesticides or
rodenticides resulting in climactically favored nations to urge lower thresholds for
pesticide tolerance and less favored nations to urge higher levels with objective
scientific evidence unable to resolve disagreements definitively.'0 But even when
trade-restrictiveness and consumer health do not hang so starkly in the balance,
it is often not Codex standards that stand in the way of greater low- or middle-
income countries' exports to Europe and North America, but regulatory and
private-sector measures that exceed what Codex recommends. 109 Indeed, as
Ching-Fu Lin has effectively described, the greatest threat to developing countries may
not be Codex standards but the more stringent, privately driven standards put in place
between large retailers in North America and Europe and preferred growers and
manufacturers in developing countries. 110
With respect to Codex's role as an agent charged, at least nominally, with the
redistribution of global wealth (i.e., its standards should accommodate the aspirations
of developing countries with strong agricultural sectors that might lift themselves out
of poverty with agricultural exports), it is not obvious that FDA has much, if any, of a
role to play. As a threshold matter, FDA's domestic mandate counsels against any
accommodation of international food safety standards purely for sake of global poverty
alleviation."' Yet FDA's current stated strategies for its global offices are articulated
largely in terms of compliance at facilities whose products are destined for the U.S.
market.112 FDA employees in the India Office, for example, focus on inspections of
products destined for the United States, and coordinate with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture and the Foreign Agricultural Services to more easily inspect
manufacturing and processing facilities in India that are producing goods destined for
the United States.11 While the FDA's International Food Safety Capacity Building
Plan emphasizes bilateral partnerships with Codex, it focuses its efforts with respect to
its international offices on exchanges of information, providing information
technologies, and establishing criteria for mutual recognition. 114 Its specific objective
with respect to Codex is to provide training on food safety and best practices.
organizations were as follows: Australia, Canada, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, India,
Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
Id. India and Malaysia have transitioned to become donor countries. Id.
1o6 See Codex Trust Fund: Background, WHO, http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areaswork/food-
standard/codextrustfund/en/ (last visited May 5, 2015).
o' Gumisai Mutume, New Barriers Hinder African Trade, AFR. RENEWAL, http://www.un.org/
africarenewal/magazine/january-2006/new-barriers-hinder-african-trade (last visited May 5, 2015).
'0o Beacham, supra note 67, at 11.
'09 Mutume, supra note 107 ("The EU, however, frequently chooses to ignore Codex recommendations
and is often much stricter. . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
"o Ching-Fu Lin, Global Food Safety: Exploring Key Elements for an International Regulatory
Strategy, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 637, 661-62 (2011).
.. Cf Margaret A. Hamburg, Improving the World Through Improved Food Safety, FDA VOICE (Dec.
13, 2012), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2012/12/improving-the-world-through-improved-food-
safety/ ("Serendipitously, our self-interest coincides with a humanitarian imperative." (emphasis added)).
112 See FDA 's International Posts: Improving the Safety of Imported Food and Medical Products,
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucml85769.htm (last updated Apr. 29, 2015).
" Id.
114 See FDA, supra note 2, at 21.
420
THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION
Conversations with foreign counterparts at FDA overseas offices are therefore aimed
at facilitating inspections, exchanging information both informally and through
formally negotiated agreements, and minimizing friction arising from regulatory
incongruities.1 15
But the increase in overseas presence and the inevitable role of developing and
low-income countries in the U.S. food supply provides FDA an opportunity to
collaborate on Codex standards with greater frequency and depth than before FSMA.
Although Section 305 of FSMA requires consultation with U.S. agencies that do not
share FDA's robust consumer protection mandate, the provisions with respect to
Codex are embedded within a broader statutory requirement to "develop a
comprehensive plan to expand the technical, scientific, and regulatory food safety
capacity of foreign governments, and their respective food industries".116 FDA is
therefore urged to examine Codex standards within the context of its foreign
partnerships, which are now limited to about 20 countries. Investing in its foreign
offices as collaborative points in the Codex standard setting process is valuable not
only to FDA's and Codex's credibility but also to FDA's role as regulatory measures
are increasingly scrutinized under international trade and investment rules. FDA, in the
near future, will need to prepare an institutional infrastructure for dealing with WTO
or other international judicial bodies that reject or order the modification of the
regulations it adopts. Working ahead of finalized Codex rules will help minimize
investment or trade-based challenges. Indeed, certain provisions of the 2009 Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act related to flavorings added to cigarettes
were recently dealt a blow by the WTO, and even though that ruling was specific to a
statutory mandate, Indonesia's challenge would have been equally applicable to an
FDA finding as to mentholated cigarettes. As the next set of trade agreements are
finalized-many of which deal with liberalized trade in agricultural goods-FDA will
need to take an active approach to Codex's work as its regulatory options may be
constrained by challenges based on Codex standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has advocated that FDA use its new powers under FSMA to inform its
Codex work, urging food labeling standards to offer flexibility for advances in
nutrition and behavioral science, bringing greater transparency, and working with
partners through its overseas offices to anticipate Codex's role as trade in agricultural
goods and foodstuffs liberalizes. In a more general sense, FSMA will allow FDA to
grapple actively with the changes facilitated by international trade and investment
agreements that will inevitably constrain and shape its regulatory role. Because FSMA
envisions FDA as a truly global consumer protection agency, adopting measures to
better advance public health science; shedding light on international regulatory
processes; and working to forge ground-level relationships will not only advance its
traditional domestic mission, but lead to stronger and better regulation in a globalized,
interdependent food system.
. See FDA, supra note 112.
116 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No 111-353, § 305(a), 124 Stat. 3885, 3958 (2011).
" See FDA, supra note 2, at 21.
. Dispute Settlement, United States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove,
WT/DS406 (Oct. 3, 2014).
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